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
SOME

R E P L Y

T O A

L E T T E R

Pretended to be writ to a Member of
Parliament in the Country in Defence of
the TREATY of Partition.



L O N D O N,

Printed in the Year 1701,

THE

191

LETTER

Printed to be sold to a Member of
Parliament in the County of Devon
the TREATY of Partition.



LONDON

Printed in the Year 1701.

IT must be confest by all (whatever just Reasons we may have of Complaint) that our Resentments should not blindly carry us on to self-destruction; in this Death-bed condition of the State Forgiveness is in season, and Union highly necessary amongst those who only differ in Name. Those well meaning men who have step'd a little aside by the influence of Party, and Persuasion, should meet with no reproach; and all should be admitted and excus'd, but the busie and getting Knaves; such Succors would infect our last Reserves, and the Nation can never struggle with Courage, till eas'd of their oppressive weight.

But are they well-wishers to this necessary Union, who confidently justify past Miscarriages? and while the mistaken and treacherous Management of the Late War is fresh in our minds, who can hope to embarque the Nation in a new one, without certainties of a better Conduct for the future?

The Personal Courage of the King, his Interest abroad, the Resentment he ought to have for the late Scornful and Perfidious Usage from the French, a thousand Reasons oblige us to hope well for the future, and to think of no past thing that can any

ways cool or shake our Zeal for his Service. Our common Safety obliges us to do the like to our Allies; the present Danger will engage them to act upon the Square with us: but this Argument goes no further; if we want the Dutch Fleet, and their Troops; if we want so brave a Prince to head the Confederacy, I hope we may spare such Ministers whose Administration has occasioned the Length and oppressive Expence of the Late War, and forced the untimely Peace.

I agree with all those who conclude that the Protestant Interest, the Libertys of Europe are given up to the French, unless there be a perfect good Understanding betwixt the King, his People, and the Confederates: but that will never be effected by the Advices of those who argue falsely, and flatter grossly; all heart-burnings must be over before we can unite to any purpose, and buckle to the great Work with that Spirit and Confidence which only can make it Successful. As we are well advised to have a Confidence in the King, so a Confidence in the Minds of the People must be created, of his Measures and Ministers.

Whoever believe the People of England afraid of a War; whoever think they would tamely resign

Conscience, Liberty and Honour, and hold all that is dear to them in Confidence of the Integrity of a Prince, who can explain Treatys by Intentions against the exprefs Terms of them; whoever conclude the People of England will hold their Estates, depending only upon the sincere inclinations of the French King for the peace of Europe; whoever hath such thoughts, I hope is much mistaken. I own English men have met with enough to bait their mettle, but yet they do not fear the Enemy; they fear the treacherous Friend, they fear Advice from Foreigners ignorant of their Constitution, and Projects from young Statesmen more ignorant than they; they are frightened when they see their Fellow-Citizens attack'd with so much malice at home, and their Enemys with so little vigour abroad: And what private Man, what Societies can be without fears, when they find their Estates (escaping the fury of the Sea and the Enemy) shipwrack'd ashore, and exposed to greater Storms in Parliament than in the

Ocean? Our Adversaries will allow the English do not fear the Battel; but have they not good reason to fear the Peace, and those sort of publick Treatys which are always attended with private Articles, especially when the Publick parts of them, known to all others, are only secrets to themselves? And can they be easy, when they grow poor in a War, in which their Neighbours grow rich? can they be satisfied to have their good Allies take that part to themselves of Treating and Concluding, and only leave it to them to fight and pay? In a word, they hate Contempt, and must now have fair play; accept their Counsels, if you expect their Money; assure them of their Libertys, and you may dispose of their Lives, and easily induce them to take up Arms against a Prince, whom no Ties from God nor Man can bind, whom no Advantages can satisfy while he hopes for greater; who enters into Treatys, only with a design to procure a profitable Opportunity of breaking them.

Some Reply to the pretended Letter, &c.

I Had not the least thought of attempting to make a Reply to the pretended Letter in justification of the Partition Treaty, till I was informed there were those that endeavoured to obtain it a Parliamentary Approbation, and that some of the Arguments of this Artificial Pamphlet were made use of to such a Design. Since I cannot match it for Art and Expression, I must make the Reader amends by Plain-dealing, that every man may easily judg of me; I will speak sincerely, and let other People know how I shall judg of them. Whoever declares against the necessity of a vigorous War, and are for temporizing Measures, if I must allow them Honesty, I shall question their Understanding; and if their Abilities are out of doubt, it is to be feared they are willing to accept of more Titular Kings from *France* than one. But for those complimenting Gentlemen, who with this Author are of opinion that we must declare in the most publick manner, we are ready to concur with Measures taken in any other place, but in the Parliament now assembled: They who advise we should put our selves in a Posture (as they call it) I must look upon such Counsellors as the highest of Flatterers; and the considering part of Mankind will certainly conclude they do not desire such Preparations, and such a management of War as is likely to rescue the World from the Usurpations of *France*; but will suppose they want a pretty competent Army

for some other intent and purpose, which they will pretend to guess at.

This being premised, I must take the liberty to say, the Partition Treaty might well be made use of to shew *Lewis XIV.* the most faithless of men: But sure the strict examination of it will never convince the World of the Wisdom and Foresight of the Promoters of it upon any other views, than of procuring such a Will to be made as should give the intire Dominions of *Spain* to that Prince who should be thought most able and ready to make good that Gift to himself, and preserve the *Spaniards* from the fatal and threatned Division of their Empire.

Now it is plain the Partition Treaty left the *Spaniards* no choice: For supposing the Emperor as strong as the *French* King, and as ready to act in behalf of his Son, *England* and *Holland* were engaged to prevent the intire Dominions of *Spain* from falling into the hands of the Arch-Duke; it is yet undetermined what they will attempt against the Duke of *Anjou's* Pretensions to the whole. This were enough to answer at once the two first Heads, shewing the weakness of the Partition Treaty, and giving undeniable Proofs that it occasion'd the Will in favour of the Dauphin's Son.

But I shall follow this Author in his own Steps, and let the World see the Sincerity and Strength of his arguing. First he allows it were much better for us, and for the Ballance of *Europe*, that the Arch-Duke were Monarch of *Spain*. But, says he,
this

this must be effected either by engaging into a confederate War against France, and aiming at the whole, or entering into such a Treaty of Partition as might peaceably accommodate both Parties. He represents the first hazardous, France in a readiness, the Allies unprovided, and the Spaniards willing by a speedy Submission to prevent the Ruin of their Country. In such Circumstances, after a long and tedious War how glorious a Conclusion of it would it be for the Allies to have forced a Prince of France to quit Spain, the Indies, the Low Countries, and content himself with the Kingdoms of Naples, Sicily, and the Dutchy of Lorrain in exchange for Milan, which are the Terms of the Partition Treaty?

He would obviate the Objection of procuring such large increase of Territories and Naval Power to France, by putting it to our Consciences, whether we think the French would have been less Gainers by the War than the Treaty; and pretends to an almost certain assurance of a general Submission amongst the Spaniards. He values at a great rate the Renunciation of the French to the Kingdom of Navarre, and the procuring the Friendship of the Arch-Duke, who would have owed the Confederates an eternal Obligation for having procured him the Kingdoms of Spain, the Indies, and the Low Countries.

These are the Arguments he makes use of to shew the necessity of making the Partition Treaty, and the great Advantages would have ensued the observation of it.

He comes next to prove the entering into this Treaty cannot well be charged with giving occasion to the Will in behalf of the Duke of Anjou; in answer to those that pretend the Partition Treaty occasion'd the Will. Think ra-

ther, says he, that the apprehension we had of such a Will was a principal Motive for our entering into such a Treaty. The Court had very good Intelligence that the Marquis of Harcourt improv'd his Master's Interest daily at Madrid. The Ministers of France made no Secret of it: It was to provide against all pretences of such a Will that France hath been induced to those positive and express Renunciations in the Treaty, if it had been in a humour of keeping to the Terms of it.

But suppose the Partition Treaty had never had a being, Do you think, says he, that the King and Grandees of Spain could ever have had Faith enough to believe the Arch-Duke might have been instituted Heir to, and put in possession of the whole Monarchy, without dismembring any part of it? Could the Spaniards imagine the Arch-Duke should ever be able to force France to an entire resignation, without the greatest Efforts from England that had ever been made in it? and did they see the Nation in a temper of engaging vigorously in a new War?

The Nomination of the Arch-Duke must of necessity kindle an universal War, and a War in which Spain must have been exposed as a Prey to the French, whilst at the same time it would have been out of the Power of the Allies to afford them timely Succors: such apparent and inevitable Dangers must of themselves have determined the King and Grandees of Spain in the Duke of Anjou's Favour, tho' the Treaty of Partition had never had a being.

The Treaty of Partition could not so exasperate his Catholick Majesty as to take such Resolutions against his own Family, were they not agreed upon afore upon the score of Necessity, since the Emperor's sticking out of the Treaty

ty was a fresh Motive to favour the Duke of Austria, and afforded a new reason to the Prejudice of France, whose King had been the great Promoter of so disagreeable a Piece of Work.

I must take the Liberty in my Observation upon these two Heads, to put them in a more natural Order. I shall begin with the last; and if I give good reasons to convince Mankind, that the Partition Treaty solely occasioned the Will in favour of the Duke of Anjou; if I produce the strongest Arguments to prove the Spaniards otherwise enclined before that politick Expedient; and if I show that Interest, Resentment and Necessity justify their present measures, I think I am pretty well eased as to the Second Point, and shall have no hard Task to make out there was no Necessity, not so much as a tolerable Excuse for such a Treaty.

I think these are Two Arguments little short of Demonstration in the Point, which confute all those frivolous Pretences, that inevitable Dangers from France, and want of timely Succors from their Allies must have determined the King and Grandees of Spain in the Duke of Anjou's Favour, tho the Treaty of Partition had never had a being.

And 1st. did not the Spaniards return an Answer to the threats of the French, with a Haughtiness natural to the Temper of that People, when the Electoral Prince of Bavaria was pitched upon to succeed to the Spanish Monarchy? Was the King of France then willing to resign his ambitious hopes? and was not his Son's Title as good against the Electoral Prince as against the Arch-Duke of Austria? were not the French as much prepared, and the Allies as much disarmed?

Was the Elector of Bavaria better able to maintain the Pretences of his Son than the Emperor, and the Forces of that Electorat a better support to Spain than all the Troops of the Empire, and the Forces of the House of Austria freed from the War with the Turks? It is plain then the Spaniards at that time were not awed with this irresistible Power of the French, nor too despairing of timely Aid from their Allies.

But 2^{ly}. the greatest Proof that France alone could not, and did not terrify the Spaniards to the degree our Author pretends, and that the French King knew it full well, is the Partition Treaty it self managed by that politick Prince, who finding he was not able alone, got England and Holland to help him to fright the Spaniards into the compliant Measures they have taken.

But, says our Author, could the King and Grandees of Spain ever have Faith enough to believe that the Arch-Duke of Austria could be instituted Heir to, and put into Possession? &c. Alas! must the poor Spaniard be accused of want of Faith? I thought his Superstition and Vanity had made him apt enough to believe and presume: say rather, that no Man could have Faith enough to believe, when first informed of it, that England and Holland should join with France to the dismembring of Spain, and giving part of its Dominions to the French.

But now we are upon the Subject of Faith, I leave it with the Reader whose Judgment he will rely upon in this case, either that of the King of France, or of this well-informed Author: he believes the Spaniards would have declared in the Favour of the Duke of Anjou, tho the Treaty

Treaty of Partition had never had a being; the King of *France* undoubtedly thought otherwise (the Marquis of *Harcourt* had not trusted him with the Secret of his Success at *Madrid*) for no Prince would chuse to have that by open and avowed Violations of solemn Treaties and Engagements, that could compass it otherwise; and as free as the ambitious Monarch is of his Word and Honour, if he could have had any Certainty of a Will in favour of the Duke of *Anjou*, but by the Stratagem of the Partition Treaty, that Treaty had never had a being, and that Prince a Party to it.

But what shall we say against matter of Fact? *The Court had very good Intelligence*, says our Author, that the Marquis of *Harcourt* daily improved his Master's Interest at *Madrid*, &c. Here indeed he speaks like a great Man, who might perhaps have had an invisible share in this admired Treaty; he knew the Intelligence of our Court, and knew it was good. This I confess was, and is a Secret to most People: but what shall a little Man at a distance reply to those that are so well apprized? I can only say this, it is hard to believe a Prince so well informed how much a *French* Ambassador could daily improve his Master's Interest at *Madrid*, should have no Subject there of his own to act for himself.

But our Author, to conclude the Head with an Argument of great Weight and Sincerity, says, *The Treaty of Partition could not so exasperate his Catholick Majesty, as to make him take such Resolutions against his own Family, were they not agreed upon before upon the Score of Necessity.* What did it signify whether the King

and *Grandeos of Spain* were pleased with the Emperor's refusing to come into the Treaty, or angry with the King of *France* for promoting the disagreeable piece of Work, as he terms it? The Emperor's refusing to consent could not prevent the Execution of the Fatal Sentence, as I may call it, of their being drawn and quartered. If they were to be angry for such a Management by their Enemies, what Indignation must they have for the like from their Friends? and if Men or Kingdoms can be exasperated (unless they are more Phlegmatick than others) what could be more affronting to the *Spaniards* in their publick, or private Capacities?

It does not add a little to the Injuries done to that Nation, to have their Ruin undertaken by methods never attempted before in all the Ages of the World. The worst effects of War, the worst usage can be received from Enemies: To have the first attempted in times of Peace, to receive the other from pretended Friends, is hard indeed. What desperate Resolves might not this produce, when done in the face of the Sun, without any pretence of occasion given by the *Spaniards* for this hard usage, or without consulting with them towards finding some Expedients for the pretended quiet and good of *Europe*?

Had their Resentments in this case led them into Measures fatal to themselves which they could have avoided, something might be said; but unless Selfpreservation be unnatural, and chusing the only Expedient left a folly, I may presume to say the Partition Treaty forced the *Spaniards* into the Interest of *France*, having deprived them of all other Expedients to keep their Monarchy entire. But

But upon his first head our Author makes this great discovery [*The Arch Duke could not be settled on the Throne of Spain, but either by Treaty or War: The War is hazardous, and the Treaty must be such as might peaceably accommodate both Parties*] from whence he would conclude this Treaty necessary. It is reported that a Lord should say in a very publick place, that a Treaty of Accommodation in its nature must please all Parties, that one was never consulted with. But this accommodating Treaty hath had a peculiar fate, it hath pleased no body: The Emperor would never consent to it, the King of France hath rejected it; and (what never happen'd afore in England) upon second thoughts not a Lord Spiritual or Temporal had a word to say for this Court-Measure.

But he is certainly in the right in his next Argument [*No People would make War under an impossibility of gaining so much by the Sword, as is offered them by a Treaty.*] But how is this made good? He tells us, *how glorious a Conclusion it would be of a tedious War, to have forced a Prince of France to quit Spain, the Indies, the Low Countries, and content himself with the Kingdoms of Naples, Sicily, Milan, &c.*

I will only follow this great *Almansor's* Example, and then make him an answer in his own Terms. I only take the small liberty to put the Confederates in possession of all France; and then how glorious a conclusion would it be of a long and tedious War, if the French King could recover so much of France, as to force the Emperor to content himself with *Strasbourg, Alsace*, and all the Places on the Rhine; the Spaniards with all the French Flanders, and the English with Normandy, Guienne, *Dunkirk* and Calais, and save the rest.

But how in the name of God (how but by the Partition Treaty, or Miracle) were the French to be put into such a condition, that the happiest and most glorious Conclusion of a War that could be expected from the united Arms of the Empire, England and Holland, to name no more, was only to have lost two Kingdoms and Milan to the French?

I hope [*the Proposer of the Posture*] would not put an exhausted Nation to new Expences, but to do something with their warlike Preparations. Then I ask him if he will not think it a glorious Conclusion of the present War, if we put the Arch-Duke of Austria in possession of all the Dominions of Spain. But supposing that possible, what have we got but what the Treaty hath prevented and lost? When he appeal'd to Spanish Faith, his Expressions were unlucky; for certainly they might believe [*he might be instituted Heir to, and put in possession of the Spanish Monarchy.*] Since that was in their own Power, the defending him in that Possession I own is another point. But is our Posture-man for a War? If so, it were monstrous to pretend they have not power to maintain what they had power to conquer; and what we can regain we might have preserved. *Veni, vidi, vici*, would not have carried a Cesar from Italy thro Spain, from Flanders to America. To go and see would have cost the haughty Monarch many a year. It was a shorter way to get it all by a Treaty with a Minister who had a foreign Birth, and no establishment in a Country of whose Interest he presumed to dispose, without any written Instructions to guide, support or justify him in his Negotiations upon so universal a Concern, and with Powers granted him to begin the Treaty in England, bearing date after it had bin agreed to, and concluded in Holland.

I must own I never met with so much elegant Nonsense, and such fallacious Arguments as are to be found in this Paper. I should never have had patience to answer them distinctly, but that at the same time it gives me an opportunity of representing our present Circumstances in a true light, which perhaps might be of some use, tho this artificial Pamphlet had never had a being.

I cannot but say of it, as I have observed of some men imposing upon the World without Parts or Probity, by an affected air of Gravity and Frankness: So this State-piece, without any Truth or Solidity, seems to have something in it, till it vanishes all to Smoak, and proves nothing under a second Thought.

It is now highly necessary we do not misjudg our own Power; but be it what it will, I am sure we must exert it, and our Ruin or Happiness depends upon the proper application of our Strength. A famous Author hath taken notice of the folly of an Ass's butting with its Ears; but the mistake is no less ridiculous, when a Bull runs his Horns against a Wall. This Writer of Letters takes strange liberties: sometimes we are guelt Animals, without any Force or Courage; but when it is for his present purpose, with too short a memory he restores us almost in the same page to our Vigour and Strength.

The Foundation of all his Arguments, either in justification of the Partition Treaty, or to perswade that the *Spaniards* without the Treaty would have declared in favour of the Duke of *Anjou*, is laid upon the almost irresistible Power of *France*; and yet, page the 10th, when he pretends to decide in these words [*The Emperor ought undoubtedly to have declar'd himself within the time allowed, &c.*] and ends in these words [*He was often forewarn'd to take care lest a Will in behalf of the Duke of Anjou*

should one day foreclose the Arch-Duke from the whole Succession, if the Imperial Court did not betimes take measures with England and Holland to oblige France in such a case to a punctual Execution of the Treaty] here he hath blown up at once the sole Foundation of all his florid Arguments. If the Emperor, *England* and *Holland* could have entred into measures to oblige *France* to any thing, then I am sure the Partition Treaty should never have had a being, which he only pretends to justify by the irresistible Power of the *French*; and if they cannot bind him (who never bound himself by any Ties, the most sacred) to what purpose is any Treaty? If those united Powers could have obliged *France* to what must have been disagreeable to *Spain*, sure they might have obliged *France*, with *Spain* of their side, to have consented to such a just and proper Settlement of the *Spanish* Empire, which the whole World would have approved, and supported.

But I had like to have forgot these important advantages of the Treaty [*The Renunciation of the French King to the Kingdom of Navarre, and the Friendship of the Arch Duke secured to us by what was obtained for him in this Treaty.*] O happy Country! if it had been secured by so sacred an Engagement, the Security had been just as good, as the Obligation is great, which the Negotiators have laid upon the Arch-Duke, who have lost him his whole Dominions by pretending to ensure him some part of what was his due.

But his weak excuses, when he magnifies the *French* Power, will appear in their true Light, if we consider that this dreadful Monarch from the prime of his Youth to this time, for above 30 Years together, hath been attempting to possess himself of one remote Province of this Empire, and ever without success, and often when the Kings of

of *England* were not only Well-wishers, but Assistants to him ; and now in his old Age, when he hath one Foot in the Grave, and under the direction of his Nurse, we are to conceive he was in a condition in a Moment to swallow up all the divided parts of the *Spanish* Empire.

That nothing can enable him so to do, that nothing can give him such an opportunity but the last Ministers, or a Ministry succeeding them taking the like measures, is what I may endeavour to show in some other Paper ; and if I have not given sufficient Answers to this elaborate Piece, I have this tolerable excuse, that I could not prevail with my self to write upon this Subject, till I was informed this Treaty was justified and applauded in a publick Assembly, and was afraid an Address of Recommendation might have been presented to the King in behalf of those able Ministers, who design'd to give the *Mediterranean* Trade, and several Kingdoms to the *French*, by the express Terms of the Treaty, and by the meaning, intent, and necessary consequences of it, have put him in possession of all the Dominions of *Spain*, for the Preservation of the Protestant Religion, the Balance of *Europe*, and Peace of the World ; but I find the Event very different from my fears. One House hath unanimously agreed the Facts, and the other no doubt will consider of them.

Our antient Constitution to encourage Learning, had given the benefit of the Clergy, that is, being able to read was an Absolution for a first fault : But *non legit* (for there are no written Instructions) and Ignorance now seems the happy excuse for a Minister of State. It is high time to address to the King, that Strangers and Tools be no more employ'd, that men of Sense may be answerable, and punish'd for their Miscarriages.

It bears an Argument which might prove most pernicious to *England*, the express'd design of the Treaty, or the natural effects of it foreseen in every Coffee House long before they hapned : but can it be doubted that Self-murder is much worse than Death ? What is taken from me by Force, I may endeavour and hope to regain ; and better venture any loss, than part with half by consent to an Enemy, who will soon have the rest, and with this aggravation, to be obliged to put the Sentence in Execution against my self.

I must be short, having too little time for the Subject ; I refer to those Pamphlets better writ than I. I had attempted the Argument : in my Opinion it is well proved by some of them, that could the War have been continued for some Years longer, it had reduced *France* ; others shew with what hopes of success it may now be begun : if either of these Pretences are to be maintained, it passes my Understanding, how the Partition Treaty is to be justified, and yet all the *Dymocks* for this Treaty are ready to sling down their Gauntlets against *France*, and declare a War.

It is to be hoped no body will more defend what hath been carried on in so affronting a manner to our Nation, and in methods so unwarrantable, and contradictory to our Constitution ; and what hath so solemnly and so unanimously been given up in a place of such Authority, may well be agreed to every where else : commonly if the present Favorite be out of question, the last Tool is given up ; it would make well meaning Men doubt of the sincerity of the present Measures, if such Arguments were made use of as would damp a growing Zeal, by fruitless Attempts to justify past Miscarriages.

This beginning might perhaps engage me to shew at more leisure, that our
past

past Mismanagements have only prevented the reduction of the *French* Power to that State, which the insolent humour of that Nation requires, which the ambitious and faithless Temper of that Prince makes necessary: the proper Methods might yet produce the same Effects; this or never is the time: but such great things are never brought about by single Efforts, by the slow motions of vast Bodies, or by the sole Capacity of the wisest of Men. The last War seemed to have but one view (which might indeed be an universal Concern) but when the general Welfare is supported by private Interest, when every Party play their own game, when the whole World must act for Self-preservation, and when the prospect is inviting enough, to make Seamen engage, no Purchase no Pay; when those that unite against the common Fo, have all to save, and much to get; and that want of Conduct in one place, may be recompensed by the success of vigorous Attempts in others: then according to the old Proverb, we have more strings to our Bow than one, and our Condition is well alter'd since the last War, if we have more to hope, and less to pay; and perhaps it is no such ill Circumstance as some may imagine, when the People are so well undeceived as to the last, that they should be something suspicious of the present Ministry; the former can do no further harm, and the others have sufficient Caution.

I leave this disagreeable Subject with Pleasure, and shall not resume it for the justification of this hasty Paper, if measures are taken for preventing the like fatal and unjustifiable Measures for the future. It were a sign of Resentment and ill Nature, to find fault only for the itch of complaining; if there were no remedies, Religion and Philosophy would incline to resignation; but our Condi-

on is far from desperate, we have a Prince whose Virtue and Interest can relieve us from the mistakes which human Nature is liable to, and from the dangerous Effects of the ill Advices, and male Administration of his Ministers: if he find disagreement amongst them, if he is sensible of the danger of Whispers and private Council, he may consult with his People who will not deceive him, and betray themselves; he may yet have the Assistance of all those who hate Tyranny, and love Liberty; nay more, of all those that dare not trust *French* Morals, *French* good Nature, with the command of the World: yet further, those that are most aggrieved by the fatal Expedient of the Partition Treaty, are most able, and willing to prevent the ill Consequences of it; and may the just Punishment of Heaven fall upon such of his Subjects, who owing him so much for his Assistance, and their Preservation in the late happy Revolution, do not support him to bring to perfection so glorious a beginning, for the rescue of the World, threatned with the loss of Religious and Civil Liberty.

The Absurdities of this Paper cannot be fully exposed, unless I had leisure to show in all particulars the great probabilities of Success in a future Confederacy against *France*, if undertaken in time, and well managed. But to conclude in a word, and give my poor Thoughts upon the whole, Whoever is wanting in raising a just Resentment against *France*, whoever disguises or diminishes our present Danger, whoever would prevent a reasonable Caution in our Parliament, whoever goes about to conceal, or excuse past Mismanagements; I think all these are equally guilty, and equally betray the last Opportunity of settling our Government at home, and preventing our Ruin from Abroad.

F I N I S.



